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Introduction  
Why do some parties live fast and die young, but others endure? Scholars of post-communist 
Central and Eastern Europe agree instability is one of the hallmarks of party politics in the 
region1 and it is therefore no surprise that many have devoted their attention to the pervasive 
cycles of party birth and party death.2 But rapid change has not affected every party in the 
region, and it is impossible to understand the dynamism in these party systems without also 
understanding the significant pockets of stability.   
It is perhaps the stability of some parties that is in the most interesting and unexpected 
phenomenon in the region. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)3 in the past quarter of a century 
has experienced the post-communist challenges of democratization, marketization, state-
building and integration into Western clubs, followed by the harsh economic conditions of the 
economic crisis after 2008 along with crises of the eurozone and international migration. Given 
this political context, the question is not how new parties were able to garner the votes of 
disillusioned and disenchanted voters battered by change, but why some parties within the party 
systems held on to their voters and a few achieved consistently impressive electoral results.  
As a complement to the emphasis on change, this article makes a preliminary effort to 
understand the factors that characterize the parties that survived and to explore the ways in 
which they differ from those that have come and gone. Drawing on an extensive research 
project integrating region-wide quantitative measures of parties and voters with in-depth 
fieldwork including semi-structured interviews with over 200 party officials from over 100 parties 
in 11 Central European countries, we argue that the key to unlocking the puzzle lies in 
combining sub-systemic and party-level factors. 
How then to explain the partial and concentrated continuity? As we have argued elsewhere4, we 
can identify a distinctive new party subsystem in which new parties tend to rise and fall rapidly 
and get replaced by even newer ones. In contrast, parties that endure are striking for their 
combination of a well-developed organization on the ground, a clear position on an enduring 
issue dimension and an ability to change party leadership. These characteristics associated with 
party longevity are precisely those that are often missing in new parties. 
 
Half Full or Half Empty? Different Levels of Stability  
As the introduction to this special issue highlights, whilst there is agreement that the region has 
not been an ocean of calm party stability, some scholars have tended to emphasize the 
changes, whereas others highlight the aspects of stability.  As the work of Rovny and Polk 
underlines much of the difference stems from the level of analysis: whether scholars focus on 
the ‘formal characteristics of party systems, party organization and voting behaviour’ or on the 
‘ideological structuration of party placements’.5 Focus on the former tends to lead scholars to 
emphasize the instability, whereas an analysis of the latter tends towards a greater focus on 
continuities.   
Both these traditions bring some analytical purchase to our understanding of the dynamics of 
party politics, but both also tend to skate over variations within the levels of analysis. In terms of 
ideological structuration, it is possible to identify key elements of continuity. Ethnic-based 
appeals in particular, but also the values dimension (social conservatism versus social 
liberalism) and socio-economic left-right differences have all provided a degree of stability in 
party competition. Nevertheless, in the 21st century issues of competence, corruption and 
novelty have become increasingly important in structuring party competition.6 These are far less 
rooted and tend to translate into ephemeral bases of party support, not least as competence, 
cleanliness and novelty tend to disappear rapidly particularly if a party enters government. 
Moreover, not just in CEE, but more broadly as Rohrschneider and Whitefield have argued, 
parties face the ‘representational strain’ of an increasingly diverse and heterogenous 
electorates.7    
When scholars turn their attention to the party systems, many tend towards emphasizing the 
‘extreme fluidity’.8 But even a causal glance at the party politics of CEE indicates it is not just 
chaotic: there do appear to be some pockets of stability. The variations are not just revealed 
from comparing and contrasting different party systems, but are also evident within those 
systems: some parties have a fleeting existence whilst others endure and the degree of churn 
varies over time. Any satisfactory attempt to examine and explain stability and change of party 
systems, therefore, needs to examine not just the macro systemic level, but also the contrasting 
fates of individual parties.            
 
Survival Patterns 
Measuring stability and change is complicated in a party environment characterized by frequent 
party splits, splinters and mergers.9 Whilst traditional volatility measures based on Pedersen’s 
Index can give us a rough indication of the overall magnitude of change in any given election 
cycle, they ultimately represent only a series of snapshots of individual election cycles. Recent 
advances which distinguish between intra- and extra- system volatility10 offer additional 
information about longevity by differentiating between new parties and those already within the 
system, but even this extends the time frame only by one additional election, and cannot 
distinguish between continuity for a relatively new party which broke through at the last election 
and another party which has endured for decades. Measures which look directly at the average 
age of parties (weighted by party electoral performance) offer better ways of capturing the 
continuity within the system,11 but even here results represent averages that cannot distinguish 
between one system with middle-aged parties and another split evenly between the very old 
and the very new. A better measure of party survival must differentiate among the share of 
support for longstanding parties and newer ones.  
The simplest method of identifying patterns of long-term survival within party systems 
categorizes and counts parties according the period in which they first emerged.  Figures 1a 
and 1b shows the recent distribution of political parties according to the era in which they first 
campaigned for election in their current form.12  To maintain consistency across countries, the 
figures group the party births into five year periods beginning in 1990 and ending in 2014.  (For 
the sake of consistency the figure does not include the 2015 and 2016 elections in Estonia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but adding those numbers does little to change the 
overall result).  The first column for each year reflects the total number of still-existing parties 
(those that received more than 0.5 per cent in the most recent pre-2015 election) categorized by 
the period in which the party first emerged.  Figure 2 gives the total vote share of such parties.  
Both figures exhibit a bimodal distribution with peaks for those parties with the most distant and 
most recent origins, and relatively smaller shares for parties that emerged during the periods in 
between.    
Among the most recently emerged parties, the share is much smaller than the number, 
suggesting a larger number of smaller parties.  The pattern is consistent with the other findings 
that new parties constitute a disproportionately large share in any given election in the region, 
but that most of these (usually but not always those with less initial support) do survive until the 
next election.13  Share of parties and votes is considerably smaller among parties that emerged 
in previous cohorts, but with these parties the vote share of the cohort exceeds the share of all 
parties from that cohort, suggesting a more robust population.  Among the oldest parties, the 
circumstances show yet a third pattern.  Here the numbers and vote share are roughly 
proportionate but the totals are higher than any cohort other than the most recent one.   
The oldest parties show a rather different pattern.  The average number and average vote 
shares of these parties are nearly identical at around 30 per cent but it is the overall level that is 
worthy of comment.  For parties established in the first half of the 1990s to receive 30 per cent 
of the vote in the first half of the 2010s is either unusually low or unusually high depending on 
the perspective.  From the perspective of most Western European countries, the 30 per cent 
figure falls far short of the norm: the corresponding figure for Germany, for example, is over 70 
per cent and for the United Kingdom and Sweden it is over 80 per cent.  From the CEE 
perspective, by contrast, this first cohort’s performance over time is unusually strong, since no 
subsequent cohort except the most recent one managed even 20 per cent of the average vote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Emergence of political parties in specific time cohorts in the most recent parliamentary 
elections (through 2014) in Central and Eastern Europe 
A. Vote share of parliamentary parties by 
cohort of emergence as a share of all 
parties 
 
Time cohort of party 
emergence 
B. Number of parliamentary parties by 
cohort of emergence as a share of all 
parties 
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Table 1 shows, furthermore, that this pattern endured over time: in each five year period, the 
largest share has gone to the oldest cohort and in all cases but one (by a narrow margin) the 
second largest share to the most recent cohort.  Each election has produced a shrinking of the 
earlier cohorts, with the largest declines coming between a cohort’s first and second period. 
 
Table 1 
Average vote share by election period of parties emerging in specific time cohorts in the 
most recent parliamentary elections (through 2014) for Central and Eastern Europe 
Period of Party 
Emergence 
(Cohort) 
Share of vote for each cohort for latest election in time period 
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-
2014 
 2015-
2016a 
1990-1994          
Absolute 
Change 
1.00   0.68   0.54   0.48   0.29     0.21   
  
-
0.32   
-
0.14   
-
0.07   
-
0.18           
1995-1999          
Absolute 
Change 
    0.29   0.10   0.09   0.06     0.11   
      
-
0.19   
-
0.01   
-
0.03           
2000-2004          
Absolute 
Change 
        0.31   0.21   0.19     0.25   
          
-
0.10   
-
0.03           
2005-2009          
Absolute 
Change 
            0.20   0.17     0.15   
              
-
0.03           
2010-2014          
Absolute 
Change 
                0.25     0.11   
                          
2015-2016          
Absolute 
Change 
                      0.17   
                          
aOnly for countries with elections during this period (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) 
Although there is clearly a notable trend across the region, the aggregation used in these 
calculations hides even more vivid patterns that are revealed by a focus on individual party 
systems.14 There is neither space nor need to present the results of each of these systems 
individually as they fall into several fairly distinct patterns, and so four party system examples 
will suffice to capture the overall dynamics of the region. 
Figure 3. sets aside the cohort approach necessary for aggregating results from multiple party 
systems and looks directly at election results.  The figure shows the results for each election 
beginning with the second, with the bars in each chart representing the total support for parties 
emerging in those elections.  Each successive election (moving downward within country 
columns) adds an additional year with its own shading (darkest and leftmost for the first election, 
lighter and further rightward for each additional election).  In a country with no new parties, the 
dark leftmost bar would remain at 100% for every election.  In a country with only new parties, 
each successive election would be represented by a lighter bar that was further from the left 
baseline. A system split in half between old and new parties would have a dark 50% bar on the 
left and a light 50% bar on the right. 
Figure 2  
Party support by year of party emergence over multiple election periods between 1990 
and 2015, by country (bars represent share of vote for parties emerging at each election) 
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Source: Authors own calculations from national election commission websites 
The case listed in the first of the columns—the Czech Republic—actually comes close to this 
hypothetical extreme, and the model shown here also closely resembles the patterns in 
Romania, Slovenia and Hungary.  The progression is a stark one, with a well-established 
system of original-cohort parties that transformed suddenly in the early 2010s into a highly 
bimodal division between old and new. A large share of the parties founded in the early 1990s 
has endured, but almost nothing else has except for parties that burst through in the 2010 
elections. In the second column, by contrast, the case of Poland (similar also to Slovakia and 
Estonia) shows a party system in which the original parties dominated only until the early 2000s 
when they were largely supplanted by several major new parties which were themselves 
threatened in the mid-2010s by yet another small but significant wave.  The end result is a 
trimodal distribution between old, middle-aged and new parties. Bulgaria, pictured in the third 
column, combines elements of the previous two; it also experienced a major break in the early-
2000s but the new party emerging at that time quickly failed and a series of newer parties have 
continued to attempt to fill the gap, producing an broader old-new gap. Finally, the fourth column 
depicts Latvia (akin also to Lithuania) where the party system is dominated by ever newer 
parties.    
Perhaps the most vivid aspect of this depiction is the way that new parties seem to leapfrog one 
another across the time scale, each election weakening the previous cohort of new parties and 
bringing in newer new ones.  But given this strong imperative toward “now,”15 it is impossible to 
ignore the dark bars on the left of each graph except Latvia’s.  Some early cohort parties 
manage to endure even when their successors do not.  It is also important to recognize the few 
but striking cases (particularly in Poland, Slovakia, Estonia and to a certain extent also in 
Bulgaria) where new parties emerging later in the cycle manage to plant their own flag and 
endure against the apparent odds.  
Table 2 provides a core list of significant parties that have managed to survive since the 
beginning of the post-Communist Era and their electoral performance over time.   As with any 
exercise in list-making, there are certain to be disagreements about inclusions and exclusions 
(particularly as relates to mergers and splits) for the purposes of this exercise we have erred on 
the side of caution when considering continuity, avoiding parties which have experienced 
significant splits and mergers (such as the Lithuanian Social Democrats which merged in 2001 
with Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania).  
 
Table 3.  
Roster of parties with long-term electoral success in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990-
2016 
Country  Most 
Recent 
Party 
Name 
Acronym Election 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Bulgaria Bulgarian 
Socialist 
Party 
BSP 53% 33% 44% 22% 17% 34% 18% 27% 15% 
Movement 
for Rights 
and 
Freedom 
DPS 6% 8% 5% 8% 8% 14% 15% 11% 15% 
Czech 
Republic 
Communist 
Party of 
Bohemia & 
Moravia 
KSČM 13% 14% 10% 11% 19% 13% 11% 15% --a 
Christian 
Dem. 
Union-
Czech 
People's 
Party 
KDU-
ČSL 
8% 6% 8% 9% 14% 7% 4% 7% --a 
Czech 
Social 
Democratic 
Party 
ČSSD 4% 7% 26% 32% 30% 32% 22% 21% --a 
Civic ODS --b 30% 30% 27% 24% 35% 20% 8% --a 
Democratic 
Partyz 
Estonia Reform 
Party 
RE --b 16% 16% 18% 28% 29% 28% --a --a 
 Centre 
Party 
K --b 14% 23% 25% 26% 23% 25% --a --a 
Hungary Hungarian 
Socialist 
Party 
MSZP 11% 33% 33% 42% 43% 19% 10% --a --a 
 Alliance of 
Young 
Democrats 
FIDESZ 9% 7% 29% 41% 42% 53% 45% --a --a 
Lithuania Electoral 
Action of 
Poles in 
Lithuania 
LRLA --b 2% 3% 2% 4% 5% 6% --a --a 
Poland Alliance of 
the 
Democratic 
Left 
SLD 12% 20% 27% 41% 11% 13% 8% 8% --a 
Polish 
People’s 
Party 
PSL 9% 15% 7% 9% 7% 9% 8% 5% --a 
Romania Social 
Democratic 
Party 
PSD 66% 28% 22% 37% 37% 33% 29% 45% --a 
Dem. 
Hungarian 
Union of 
Romania 
UDMR 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% --a 
National 
Liberal 
Party 
PNL 6% 3% --c 7% 20% 19% 17% 20% --a 
Slovakia Christ. 
Dem. 
Movement 
KDH 19% 9% 10% --c 8% 8% 9% 9% 5% 
Slovak 
National 
Party 
SNS 14% 8% 5% 9% 3% 12% 5% 5% 9% 
Party of 
the 
Hungarian 
Coalition 
SMK 9% 7% 10% 9% 11% 12% 4% 4% 4% 
Slovenia Social 
Democrats 
SDP 17% 14% 9% 12% 10% 30% 11% 6% --a 
Slovene 
Farmers' 
Alliance 
SKZ 13% 9% 19% 10% 7% 5% 7% 4% --a 
Slovenian 
Dem. Party 
SDS  3% 16% 16% 29% 29% 26% 21% --a 
Source: European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook, all issues. 
aCountry election cycles do not include this number of elections 
bParty did not compete in first post-Communist elections 
 cParty participated in electoral coalition.  In both of these cases results do not differ significantly 
from elections before and after. 
Given the tendency to novelty in the region, this relatively small set of parties deserves closer 
scrutiny.  In the section that follows, we highlight three factors that explain these hardy 
perennials’ ability to weather the storms and survive the harsh winters in the political garden. 
 
Survival Factors 
In examining the vulnerabilities of parties in Western Europe Peter Mair16 identified three factors 
seen to have a special impact on the fate of individual parties rather than general ideological 
predispositions or broad political alignments: the party’s organizational strategy and style, its 
specific appeals and its leadership.  Mair’s suggestion of factors that ‘may be considered as 
having the capacity to have an impact upon the fortunes’ of individual parties’ offers a useful 
framework from which to examine the exceptional features of the original cohort parties that 
have exhibited unusual longevity as well as the few later cohort parties that have shown the 
capacity to endure.  
Organization: Enduring by building 
Thanks in no small part to technological advances such as television and the internet, 
party organization has been seen to be increasingly unimportant in winning and 
retaining votes. Party organization is expensive and inefficient, as well as constructing 
cumbersome barriers to adaptation thanks to grassroots opinion which is often seen to 
be more inflexible to change. Indeed, in the early 1990s the expectation of many 
scholars was that the parties that would emerge in CEE would not have extensive 
organizational structures.17 Subsequent developments suggest organization does not 
even appear to be necessary for initial success. Indeed, the electorally most successful 
new party breakthrough in CEE, Bulgaria’s New Simeon II Movement (NDSV), was 
achieved by an organization that was not even registered as a party until a few weeks 
before the 2001 election and hence ‘for all practical purposes’ it can be said that NDSV 
won 42 per cent of the vote in that election ‘with no members’.18  
In more recent times the role played by the internet, especially social networking 
websites, in galvanizing electoral support for new parties such as Freedom and 
Solidarity in Slovakia, Bulgaria without Censorship, Kukiz '15 in Poland and Way of 
Courage in Lithuania suggests that an extensive party organization—indeed anything 
more than a shell—may not be necessary in 21st century electoral politics.    
Yet large organizations also possess survival value.  As the work of Spirova, Tavits and 
Ibenskas19, have cogently argued, however, there is a direct connection between party 
organization and party longevity. Tavits in particular shows it is not just the size of the 
party membership that matters, which is often the proxy measure for party 
organization20, but rather the extensive network of local branches. These branches 
combined with members and professional staff are important because they facilitate 
‘immediate, frequent and organized contacts with the electorate.’21 They help mobilize 
voters, provide visibility for a party, marshall activists and run professional campaigns. 
Whilst blogs, Facebook and Twitter might mobilize the young, they do not have much 
impact on older voters (who tend to be the most loyal) for whom personal contacts and 
interaction are particularly important. Whilst cautioning that it is not the single silver 
bullet of survival, Tavits’ extensive empirical analysis of her four case studies (Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic) demonstrates that parties that invest in 
strong party organizations are ‘more likely to succeed electorally’ and ‘survive as 
significant players in the electoral arena.’22  
 
The evidence from specific CEE countries helps to explain the ways in which the party 
organization actually promotes survival.  A wide range of examples suggests that a 
developed party organization is at its most significant less in establishing a party on the 
political scene, but more in ensuring a party can weather the political storms associated 
with electoral set-backs and defeat. As with certain aspects of political leadership (see 
below), organization is not only about attracting voters but also—perhaps more 
importantly—about recuperation and transition during political difficulties.  All of the 
parties in the region that have bounced back from major electoral set-backs to win 
subsequent elections, such as the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Czech Social 
Democrats and the Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic, have had - at least in 
relative terms compared to their competitors - large memberships, extensive presence 
throughout their respective countries and a sizeable professional staff.  Moreover, 
parties such as the Hungarian Socialists have relied on significant party organization 
and membership to survive scandals that other parties would have been fatal. Lack of 
organization, by contrast, contributes a brittleness to political party support.   
Organization also becomes important in certain cases of victory.  Entry into 
government—even as a junior partner - is extremely demanding of party resources, 
especially of human resources, drawing the party’s best and brightest into governmental 
and support roles in various ministries. Prioritizing government at the expense of party 
organization has an immediate logic, but it weakens the party in the long-term. 
A well-developed organizational structure, however, is no guarantee of survival. As the 
case of Slovakia shows well, the two parties with the largest membership and most 
extensive party organizations over the first two post-communist decades, the Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Party of the Democratic Left both failed to 
survive. The key to both those parties’ failures lies in leadership and in appeals.23  
 
Appeals: Lengthening the shelf life 
A well-developed organization can help a party survive a storm, but voters tend not to 
choose a party because of its organizational structure. The survival of political parties 
depends not just about the vehicles of politics, but also the substance of political 
contestation i.e. the content of parties’ electoral appeals. Here again, a characteristic 
seen as possibly incidental proves to be significant.  
There has been a wide range of parties elected over the past quarter of a century in 
Central and Eastern Europe promoting nearly every conceivable agenda and some 
promoting none at all. Many parties did not seem to fit the traditional Lipset-Rokkan 
model and other standard issue dimension models. Indeed, at times it has seemed 
easier to explain patterns of party politics with reference to valence issues of 
competence, personalist leaders and new issues of corruption24, than the standard 
toolkit of party politics scholars.   
Whilst not doubting that valence, competence, clean hands and personalistic appeals 
have offered something these are appeals which have been used to a greater extent by 
newer or wannabe entrants25. The list of surviving parties above contains an extremely 
high concentration of parties representing specific sides of long-standing conflicts: 
ethnic minorities (and some representing national goals of ethnic majorities), rural 
electorates, religious affiliations, post-Communist and social-democratic parties.  
Given the ethnic mix in many countries in CEE it is perhaps no surprise that there are 
parties that appeal to ethnicity, especially as the representative of an ethnic minority, 
such as the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS) in Bulgaria. Although the 
provisions of the Bulgarian constitution mean it is formally not an ethnically based party, 
the party is seen in the eyes of voters as the representative of the country's ethnic 
Turkish population. The example of the DPS underlines two significant points linked to 
duration. Firstly, the appeal is ethnically rooted. In the large literature which has 
discussed the utility of applying cleavage-based explanations to party politics in CEE26 
one deep societal division which has translated into a dividing line of politics is 
ethnicity.27 Secondly, and linked, the party has taken a stance on a significant issue 
divide. Its party brand ensured it could project itself as the standard bearer defending 
the interests of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. In short and put simply, it has been seen in 
the eyes of voters as standing for something. For scholars of the longer-established 
democracies of Western Europe this seeming banalism is at the root both of the 
partisanship and party identification at the heart of enduring success of many 
established parties over many decades, especially on the moderate left, but also the 
key to explaining why many of these parties have seen their votes erode in more recent 
times.   
Noam Lupu's analysis of the fate of parties in Argentina and Venezuela is illustrative 
here.28 Lupu argued that economic crises per se did not lead to breakdown in electoral 
support, but that economic crisis was particularly likely to prove fatal when a party had 
also diluted its brand. The key here is that parties that are not seen in the eyes of the 
electorate as being a standard bearer on one side of a key issue divide lack an anchor 
to ensure they do not get blown away by the storms. Returning to the Slovak case 
above, by 2010 HZDS was a party which did not appear to stand for much that was 
distinctive. Its national appeal was squeezed by the Slovak National Party and the use 
of nationalist themes by Smer and its appeal to the losers of the transition had largely 
been seized by Smer in 2002 as that party projected itself as the opponents of the 
government’s neoliberal agenda. All that was left was the fading charisma of the party’s 
leader and founder, Vladimír Mečiar, who stubbornly refused to pass the leadership 
baton.     
Parties which project themselves as the defenders of the interests of ethnic groups, 
rural electorates, pensioners, religious values, communist nostalgia etc. may not 
become major players on their political scene. They act as standard bearers of one side 
of an issue divide, often away from the political centre; dominating an electorally fruitful 
niche which breeds loyalty and partisanship amongst a section of the electorate and 
hence yielding a steady electoral return at the ballot box. In contrast to accounts of 
niche parties in Western Europe29 many of these niche appeals emerged at the 
beginning of democratic contestation i.e. not at a later stage than the more traditional 
left-right economic appeals.   
Appeals to defend an ethnic group, the nation, rural electorates, religious affiliations, 
nostalgia for communist times etc. stand in stark contrast to the appeals often used by 
parties which prove to have shorter shelf-lives. For many new parties a central theme—
in many cases the central theme—is corruption, often wrapped up in a broader “law and 
order” appeal.30  
The characteristics of party newness and anti-corruption appeals have deep affinity: 
new parties can use the corruption question to turn their chief liability—their 
inexperience—into an asset. Likewise, anti-corruption appeals are more convincing 
coming from parties that do not need to defend past behaviour.  The problem, however, 
is that ostentatiously new parties have difficulty remaining so. In societies where there 
are significant opportunities for corruption, or even in those in which the population 
suspects such opportunities, political leaders struggle to maintain their reputation for 
cleanliness.  New and clean alternatives themselves become the corrupt politicians and 
without alternative appeals to fall back on, such parties simply collapse. 
This observation suggests a significant alteration in the way we understand political 
competition. Current spatial models employ a distinction between positional dimensions, 
on which parties take different stances on relevant issues, and valence dimensions, on 
which parties occupy positions measured against a commonly held baseline such as 
competence or incorruptibility. Commonly discussed valence issues tend to emphasize 
personal or behavioural characteristics of parties which, it is often presumed, may be 
changed more easily than core beliefs about policy issues that define a party’s identity. 
Leaving aside evidence that parties can shift their programmatic identities31, examples 
from CEE offer evidence that valence issues may also reflect a party’s core identity and 
appeal to a specific segment of votes—those with strong aversion to corruption—just as 
much as national identity or economic issues appeal to specific segments of the 
population with their own politically-relevant preferences.  Under these conditions some 
of the core differences between positional and valence issues dissolve and the result is 
a cross-cutting “corruption” dimension. The opportunities for corruption (and public 
presumption that leaders will take advantage of those opportunities), however, means 
that while the dimension may endure from election to election, successful parties can 
rarely remain plausibly at the “anti-corruption” pole of the dimension, but since the anti-
corruption voting base endures, each election period creates an incentive for a party to 
insert itself into the vacated “anti-corruption” space, and the affinities discussed above 
give significant advantage to a party that can portray itself as new.  
 
Our focus in this article is on the parties that have endured since the early 1990s, but 
casting a glance at middle-aged parties that have endured and have the potential to 
survive for longer, it is striking how many of them such as Law and Justice in Poland or 
Smer-Social Democracy in Slovakia have taken a stance on a major issue divide. Both 
of these parties, however, do suffer from one notable weakness linked to leadership 
which we will return to below.  
In a similar vein to our discussion of party organization, we can also underline 
something implicit in the preceding discussion: government participation is also an 
effect intensifier.  When given access to government resources, new and “clean” parties 
often distinguish themselves as anything but, not because they are somehow 
necessarily worse than established parties, but because scandal undermines the main 
appeal of an anti-corruption party. 
Leadership: Charting a source between Scylla and Charybdis 
The combination of appeals which attract voters and persuade them to stay and 
organizational structures which cushion blows when parties experience downturns at 
the ballot box go a significant way towards explaining enduring, but the first vulnerability 
of party which Mair identified for Western Europe provides an important additional piece 
of the jigsaw.  
At one level part of the explanation for endurance of parties like Fidesz in Hungary, the 
Slovene Democratic Party or the Centre Party in Estonia owe much to the appeal and 
charisma of their longstanding party leaders: Viktor Orbán, Janez Janša and Edgar 
Savisaar.32 Leader-focused parties can endure for a significant period of time, as long 
as biology permits. But that very strength can be a source of weakness. To illustrate 
how leadership feeds into party endurance, it is helpful to start by looking at the genesis 
of parties.    
The reasons for the predominance of leader-focused parties are manifold. One lies in 
the nature of new party formation: many new parties begin life on the initiative of 
political leaders who have become frustrated with their ability to achieve their goals 
within another party. Since such efforts are most effective when coordinated by a single 
leader or a small, tightly organized group, there is a tendency for split and splinter 
parties to begin their lives already under the tight control of one or a few individuals.  As 
leader-driven projects, these “parties of one man [or woman]” often contain few effective 
mechanisms for challenging the preferences of the leader. A second reason lies in the 
questions of party finance: parties may begin as the projects of wealthy individuals, or 
as the project of an individual with close ties to particular sponsors.   
Strikingly, in light of the results of figures 1 and 2, generational shifts in the media 
environment may also contribute to the emergence of leader-driven parties since 
individual stories make for more compelling media narratives, especially if the leader 
already has a cache of celebrity. It is noteworthy - but not altogether surprising in the 
era of “got talent” celebrity - that an unusually high share of new party leaders in the 
past decade have been “in-front of the camera” media stars including Lithuanian game-
show host Arunas Valinskas, Bulgarian talk-show host Volen Siderov, and Czech 
investigative journalist Radek John. 
 
The emergence of leader-driven parties with low internal accountability has a number of 
consequences for volatility within party systems. To borrow from classical mythology, 
new parties are offered a choice between Scylla and Charybis: maximizing possible 
gain by risking everything (Charybis) or accepting certain losses to ensure survival 
(Scylla). Leader-driven parties tend to opt for Charybis. Although many leader-driven 
parties manage to endure and even to thrive, their Achilles heel is that their leaders 
have unpredictable tenures with some enduring for years (Slovakia’s Vladimír Mečiar) 
and some (such as Lithuania’s Valinskas) encountering fatal scandals shortly after 
electoral triumph.  When death, incapacity or scandal takes the leader of a leader-
centric party, the result is usually catastrophic, because leaders tend not to lavish effort 
on the cultivation of potential successors who are also potential rivals. Indeed one of the 
best tests of party centralization is a negative answer to the question “Can you imagine 
[Party X] without [Leader Y]?”  In many cases, the task is very difficult. 
 
By avoiding plans for succession, leader-driven parties hasten the process of new party 
creation in several ways. Firstly, they create gaps for new party entry by inflexible 
readings of the electoral environment and are precluded from renewing their image in 
the eyes of voters or through leadership change and thus they become brittle.  Parties 
without a single strong leader may prove to be messy affairs with unseemly intra-party 
conflict, but they have a better chance of reinventing themselves and recovering from 
poor election results or scandal or an aging voting base by opting for a new face well 
illustrated by the Czech Social Democrats’ response to its crisis in the mid-2000s when 
two leaders were replaced in quick succession. Secondly, they generate public figures 
to fill the gaps.  The argument that splintering produces leader-driven parties, also 
works in the reverse direction: leader-driven parties produce splinters, as ambitious 
political leaders find themselves with no room for advancement and strike out on their 
own.  One of the most notorious examples of this pattern is Slovakia’s HZDS, which 
produced at least seven discernible splinters, almost always headed by a frustrated 
party vice-chair or other prominent party figure(s).  
 
Whilst the above discussion highlights the weaknesses of leader-centric parties in 
organizational terms, it is worth stressing that choosing the Charybis option can yield 
initial electoral bounty. Indeed, one of the tried and tested ingredients for garnering 
initial electoral success lies on the shelf marked ‘popular personality.’ The problem for 
parties is that the popularity of the party leader is often wrapped up with an appeal of 
purity (or at least a desire to root out corruption which we discuss below) and an appeal 
to deliver the goods. Appeals to purity, however, are difficult to maintain once a 
politician has had his/her hands on power. Party leaders can remain popular after a 
party’s sheen of newness has worn off, but for leaders to remain popular they need to 
have delivered something tangible to their core electorate and they need to project 
themselves as the standard bearers of one side of a major issue divide. 
 
The Survival of “Survival”?   
The search for some elixir that might explain the survival of Central and Eastern 
European parties not only helps to narrow down the causal factors, but also helps to 
address the broader reasons why not every party makes what once were fairly 
predictable choices.  That parties seeking long-term survival should build organizations, 
stand for something durable and be ready to cut loose leaders who have stopped lifting 
and started dragging (and avoid entering government until ready to do so) would not 
have surprised most mid-20th century party creators, but these are not the efforts 
pursued by many of their early 21st century counterparts.  The reasons lie not only with 
the parties but also with the parties’ environment and so it is useful to think about the 
broader context.   
Thinking about time and duration with regard to political parties provoked van Biezen33 
to consider three sets of effects which provoke a series of further questions about party 
longevity: 
1. Generation effects, which depend on the answer to the question “when you were 
born?” (and should hold irrespective of how old the year in which the question is 
asked)  
2. Period effects, which depend on the answer to the question “what year is it?” 
(and should hold irrespective of the age of a party)  
3. Life-cycle effects, which depend on the answer to the question: “how old are 
you?” (and should hold irrespective of the year in which the question is asked.  
Each of these effects has its own telltale signs and each suggests a different causal 
mechanism.  The parties of Central and Eastern Europe exhibit a distinct profile of 
effects that helps clarify the region’s overall trajectory: 
The most striking results are signs of a generational effect, at least to the extent that the 
earliest cohort of post-Communist party systems whose relatively strong investment in 
organization and long-lasting appeals appear to have endured over time in that cohort 
and may help explain their relatively long survival, while subsequent generations of 
parties engaged less in the same kind of party building.  The roots of this difference are 
varied.  Part of the difference lies in the circumstances of the early post-Communist 
experience:  the strong party organizational structure of Communist parties taken on by 
many of their successors, the open field for mobilizing long-shelf-life issues such as 
ethnicity and religion, and the early impressions by many party founders that success 
could only be had by closely following Western political party models from the earlier 
ear of mass parties.  Later generations found fewer ready-made opportunities for 
organization and enduring appeals and saw less need for these efforts as new 
technologies facilitated quick, easy and cheap communication with prospective voters 
and nimble coordination among founders and activists. 
Both generational and period effects rely on party responses to eternal pressures, but 
the period effects occur when contemporary external pressures overwhelm past 
pressures that previously shaped the party.   The trend toward lightweight organization 
and less-durable appeals in newer parties shows clear generational effects in parties 
founded at that time, but there is less evidence that it has also had period effects on 
parties established earlier.  The parties of the first generation tended to maintain their 
survival-enhancing characteristics rather than opting for the lightweight organization and 
less durable-appeals that later came into prevalence.  (Since the maintenance of past 
characteristics may have been stronger among the survivors than among those that 
failed it is plausible that period effects did occur but that they did not enhance survival.)   
Finally, there is the more complicated question of life-cycle effects.  These resemble 
period effects in their assumption that parties do change, but life-cycle effects posit a 
different impetus, focusing not on external pressure but on internal imperatives related 
to organizational development.  In van Biezen’s own work on party organization she 
suggests that these may be the least likely,34 but the examples above suggest that this 
less-traveled path can also play a fundamental role in overall party system 
development.  Noteworthy here are the parties such as Slovakia’s Smer and Bulgaria’s 
GERB and to a certain extent Poland’s PiS which actively sought out the characteristics 
associated with the earlier party cohort.  Relatively few parties appear to have been 
able to respond to these pressures for internal change, but some of those that did had a 
fundamental effect on their respective party systems, slowing down the cycle of new-
party replacement, at least for a while.   Whether those parties become permanent party 
system anchors, like the some of the parties of the earliest cohort, or merely temporary 
restraints will depend on their ability to sustain the organization and appeals that they 
have built and especially on their handling of the leadership question, the one area 
where Smer’s Fico, GERB’s Borrisov and PiS’s Kaczyński (among others) have yet to 
opt for a more sustainable, “old-style” model. 
 
Into the Woods: Party Survival and Population Dynamics 
It is no accident that van Biezen’s model and subsequent analyses—including this 
one—adopt biological metaphors.  Intentionally or not, scholarly literature on political 
parties often turns images borrowed from more immediate experience.  We speak 
without hesitation about parties being born and dying, and we define party life cycles 
and the periods of conception, endurance and mortality.  While it is important always to 
be aware that the map is not the territory, that the metaphor is not the matter at hand, a 
careful adaptation of these models from the physical and biological world can help to 
broaden our understanding and improve our subsequent explorations.   
The processes of evolutionary biology alluded to by van Biezen and other life-cycle 
metaphors offers potentially useful insights into how party choices interact with the 
environment to produce the patterns we see in Central and Eastern Europe.  Biologists 
classify species’ survival strategies into two sets of related categories.  Some species 
use a method that biologists call K-selection, producing only a few offspring but 
investing large amounts of attention to their upbringing.  By discouraging infant 
mortality, this selection method tends to produce species with a survival pattern called 
Type I in which a high percentage survive infancy and die at an age close to the species 
maximum.  Other species survive by a method known as r-selection, investing little in 
the survival of their offspring but producing extremely large numbers.  The result of this 
method is usually is a survival pattern called Type-III (Type-II is reserved for 
intermediate outcomes) which involves early death for the vast majority and survival 
(potentially very long-term survival) for a very few.  Whereas the subjects of most 
studies on political parties follow a method akin to K-selection and have Type I survival 
patterns, it is the r-selection model and Type-III survival patterns that more closely 
characterize the older and newer parties in Central and Eastern Europe.  In Type III 
species, furthermore, survival may increase substantially “after an individual reaches a 
certain age,” often once it has achieved a developmental milestone such as the 
significant “stairstep” drop in mortality that occurs when young crustaceans and 
molluscs survive long enough to develop hard outer shells,35 or when parties survive 
long enough to develop regular procedures for changing leaders or adapting party 
appeals.   
These patterns conform quote closely to the circumstances in which each type of 
strategy tends to emerge in natural systems:  “K-selected organisms are adapted to 
environments that typically have a stable climate and little opportunity for rapid 
population growth” while “[m]ost r-selected species have an advantage in habitats that 
experience unpredictable disturbances, such as fire, floods, hurricanes, drought, or cold 
weather, which create new opportunities by suddenly reducing a population to low 
levels.”36   Likewise, the model of forest dynamics for “regrowth following disturbance” 
as developed by Peet and Christensen bears remarkably close resemblance to post-
Communist party development, with successive periods of establishment of large 
numbers of seedlings in open land followed by a thinning that drives out nearly all 
weaker plants, and transition periods in which the death of particular trees (“often the 
consequence of factors such as lightning, windthrow or disease”) creates a patch of 
light and soil resources becomes available within the forest. In this patch, new seedlings 
can become established, and finally a steady state in which all of the previous three 
processes occur simultaneously “in miniature.”37 
Political party systems in Central and Eastern Europe show evidence of moving toward 
that last stage, a steady state in which a few longstanding old parties coexist with the 
coming and going of generations of fragile newcomers some of which may survive long 
enough to become firmly-established in their own right.   Here the reality diverges from 
the metaphor, however.  Parties are not seedlings.  Party leaders have the ability to 
make conscious choices even in the face of environmental pressures.  Whether the 
balance shifts toward the young or the old will depend largely on whether party leaders 
decide to opt for the strategies of rapid growth and quicker death or the more limiting 
but also more sustainable strategies discussed here.  If they opt for r-strategies and 
Type III survival curves, then the occasional natural deaths of the older parties will leave 
a political landscape forever dominated by the young. 
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